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TOXIC SUBSTANCE 
CONTAMINATION: THE RISK-
BENEFIT APPROACH TO 
CAUSATION ANALYSIS 
The dangers posed by chemical wastes have been slowly seep-
ing into the public and political consciousness over the past dec-
ade. 1 The health effects of chemical waste contamination are be-
ginning to surf ace, and incidents such as the Love Canal disaster 
in Niagra Falls, New York, are receiving widespread attention.2 
In some toxic waste situations, the causal link between contami-
nation of the environment and injury to health is relatively 
clear.3 In cases involving areas of scientific controversy and un-
certainty, however, plaintiffs may be unable to prove causation, 
an essential element of any action to recover damages.' Scientific 
uncertainty, consequently, may often preclude these victims of 
toxic waste contamination from obtaining relief under existing 
law. 
' The scope of the problem is indicated by a recent estimate by the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) that 32,254 sites may exist which contain potentially danger-
ous amounts of hazardous wastes. The EPA states that 638 of these sites may contain 
quantities of hazardous wastes which could cause imminent hazards to public health. 
(1978] 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1342. The Second Annual Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act (RC~A) Report says that the most significant effect of disposal of hazardous 
wastes is the contamination of groundwater, with over half of the disposal facilities pro-
jected to be leaking contaminants into the groundwater. [1979) 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 
2303. See also Koch, Cleaning Up Chemical Dumps Posing Dilemma for Congress, 
CONG. Q., March 22, 1980, at 795; and [1980] 11 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 709. 
• See generally M. BROWN, LAYING WASTE: THE POISONING OF AMERICA BY Toxic 
CHEMICALS (1979). Medical experts believe the Love Canal contamination to have caused 
higher incidences of cancer, miscarriages, birth defects, respiratory and pulmonary dis-
eases, heart problems, and nervous disorders in residents of the area. See also American 
Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA), Toxic TORTS (1972). 
• For example, the Love Canal situation presents no questions as to the source of the 
contaminants, or whether they affect health. See, e.g. M. BROWN, supra note 2, at 5, 18-
20, 23, 25, 44-45. 
• For an overview of how scientific uncertainties may affect the drawing of causal rela-
tionships, see Gelpe & Tarlock, The Uses of Scientific Information in Environmental 
Decisionmaking, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 371, 404-407 (1974). See generally H. HART & A. 
HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 
§§ 41-45 (4th ed. 1971); A. BECHT & F. MILLER, THE TEsT OF FACTUAL CAUSATION IN 
NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY CASES (1961). 
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A tragedy involving residents living near Hemlock, Michigan, 
presents a current illustration of this dilemma.11 Hemlock area 
residents allege that reinjection wells used for disposal of by-
products of chemical manufacture have caused contamination of 
their well-water.8 The people in the area have suffered consider-
able health effects, including miscarriages, tumors, and nervous 
system disorders.7 State authorities have concluded, however, 
that insufficient evidence exists to establish a causal link be-
tween the complaints and private well water,s notwithstanding 
official statements that the high incidence of health disorders in 
the Hemlock area is hard to explain. 8 The Hemlock victims face 
virtually insurmountable barriers to relief, due to problems in 
proving the existence of toxic substances in their well water,10 in 
determining the movement of groundwaters, 11 and the need for 
extensive and possibly unobtainable medical studies. 12 
This article argues that the dilemma described above requires 
change and proposes a new standard for causation in this type of 
toxic contamination case. Part I examines the difficulties posed 
by conventional common law relief mechanisms, and the inade-
• See generally M. BROWN, supra note 2, at 185-203. 
• Reinjection wells are used for subsurface disposal of industrial wastes. The United 
States Geological Survey finds reinjection wells acceptable, but some states have banned 
their use. State geologists investigating the Hemlock situation considered it unlikely that 
the wastes could migrate upward to taint drinking wells. However, it is not clear whether 
old oil wells in the area were properly capped, raising the possibility that the wastes had 
risen up through them to the surface. See M; BROWN, supra note 2, at 194-97. See also 
Tripp and Jaffe, Preventing Groundwater Pollution: Towards a Coordinated Strategy to 
Protect Critical Recharge Zones, 3 HARv. ENVT'L L. REV. 1, 6 n. 38 (1979). 
7 See M. BROWN, supra note 2, at 187-90. 
• Id. at 95, 97, 100. A study by the Michigan Department of Health has found insuffi-
cient evidence "to establish a link betweeen the complaints and private well water." 
Chemicals and Health Center, Michigan Department of Public Health, The Hemlock 
Area Study 14 (March, 1979) [hereinafter Hemlock Area Study]. 
• The extent of the health problems, when compared to a control area, have prompted 
the state health director to conclude that the differences are difficult to explain. See M. 
BROWN, supra note 2, at 188. 
10 A sampling of wells in the Hemlock area by the Michigan Department of Natural 
Resources (DNR) has not found evidence of organic chemical contaminants. GROUND-
WATER COMPLIANCE AND SPECIAL STUDIES SECTION, WATER QUALITY DIVISION, MICHIGAN 
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL REsouRCBS, INVESTIGATION OF GROUNDWATER QUALITY IN THE 
HEMLOCK AREA OF SAGINAW COUNTY 1 (April, 1979). Tests by an independent laboratory, 
however, found low amounts of chemicals theoretically capable of causing many of the 
reported ailments. See M. BROWN, supra note 2, at 191-92. 
11 See generally D. TODD, GROUNDWATER HYDROLOGY 44-77 (1959). See also M. 
BROWN, supra note 2, at 194-97. 
11 Determining which substances caused which health effects would require in-depth 
scientific studies which may take a number of years to perform. See, e.g., E. BAKER, P. 
LANDRIGAN AND J. HARRINGTON, PERsPECTIVBS ON ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH: VIGNETTES 
FROM RECENT EPIDEMIOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1977), reprinted in ATLA, supra note 2, 
at 127-39. 
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quacies of existing statutory relief mechanisms. Part II scruti-
nizes a more lenient burden of proof standard, the risk-benefit 
approach, which some courts have applied when faced with sit-
uations involving scientific uncertainties. The risk-benefit ap-
proach will be applied to causation analysis in the context of 
damage recoveries, using the. Hemlock, Michigan, situation as a 
case study. Part III discusses present congressional proposals, 
and compares the economic efficiencies of such legislative action 
with those of a judicially implemented relaxation of causation 
requirements. This article concludes that relaxation of causation 
requirements through the adoption of the risk-benefit approach 
is a response the judicial system can and should make in cases 
involving scientific uncertainty. 
I. REMEDIES CURRENTLY AVAILABLE 
A. The Inadequacies of Common Law Relief 
Traditional elements of tort law causes of action place a num-
ber of obstacles in the path of plaintiffs in any chemical contam-
ination case.13 The most formidable requirement in cases involv-
ing scientific uncertainty is the proof of causation. Proving a 
legally cognizable link between the defendant's conduct and the 
plaintiff's harm is traditionally required to establish that the de-
fendant's activities constitute negligence, nuisance, or that the 
defendant be held strictly liable.14 Proof of causation, however, 
10 The persistent backlog of cases on court dockets, for example, can be a potent 
weapon for the defense. A long wait for relief can be especially difficult for victims with 
very limited financial means. Second, the trial itself can be long and costly. Finally, dis-
covery proceedings such as intensive physical examinations may also become burden-
some to plaintiffs. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, modified, 312 U.S. 655 
(1940); Cardinal v. University of Rochester, 187 Misc. 519, 63 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1946). See 
also J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: No-FAULT INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND 
SERVICES (1975). 
14 Causation is an essential element of a cause of action based on negligence. See 
PROSSER, supra note 4, § 41; and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 281, 431 (1965). 
Courts will deny relief if the causation element is no.t adequately proven. See, e.g., Shep-
tur v. Procter & Gamble Distrib. Co., 261.F.2d 221 (6th Cir. 1958) (plaintiff failed to 
show sufficient evidence that defendant's dish detergent caused her dermatitis); Heck v. 
Beryllium Corp., 424 Pa. 140, 226 A.2d 87 (1966) (new trial granted because evidence did 
not show to what extent certain portions of defendant's emissions could have been harm-
ful). The causation requirement also applies to causes of action based on a nuisance 
theory. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 822, 431 (1979). See, e.g., Joldersma v. 
Muskegon, 286 Mich. 520, 282 N.W. 229 (1938) (plaintiff did not meet burden of proof 
by showing that defendant permitted salt water to seep into the ground and that salt 
appeared at a distance several feet to the south). But see Watson v. Great Lakes Pipeline 
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like proof of any essential element of the plaintiff's case, must 
rise to or exceed the "preponderance of the evidence" stan-
dard.16 Clearly, in a situation involving unavailability of infor-
mation due to scientific uncertainty, it may be impossible to 
meet the burden of proof usually imposed. Plaintiffs are thus 
foreclosed from relief simply because science has not sufficiently 
advanced to enable them to prove an essential element of their 
case. 
Unavailability of scientific information in situations such as 
groundwater contamination by toxic substances can occur in two 
ways. First, the information may be unobtainable by any means 
given the state of current science and technology, and thus be 
"unknowable" in some sense. Second, the information may be 
theoretically "knowable," but only if a massive commitment of 
resources is made to acquire it (e.g., enormous expenditures of 
funds, manpower, and/or time).18 The result of either type of 
unavailability is the same in practice: plaintiffs are unable to 
meet what is essentially an unprovable burden of proof. 17 
Tort law does provide for one doctrine which allows relief in 
some situations marked, by the absence of a clearly proven 
causal link: res ipsa loquitur. For application of res ipsa loqui-
Co,, 85 S,D, 310, 182 N.W,2d 314 (1979) (the court considered such circumstantial evi-
dence as defendant's adjacent business being involved in handling and storing petroleum 
products sufficient to show causation of damages), The causation problems present in 
other tort remedies are also inherent in strict liability doctrine, See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. 
Ainsworth, 247 So. 2d 815, 816-17 (Miss. 1971) (plaintiff's failure to identify substance 
that caused the harm, and to show that defendant was responsible for its presence was 
insufficient proof of causation); 35 Estates Inc. v. Central Park Garden Inc., 35 App. Div. 
2d 915, 316 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1970) (imposition of strict liability does not dispense with need 
to prove causation). 
'" See generally E. CLEARY, McCORMICK ON EvIDENCE § 338 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter 
cited as McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE). 
,. The expenditures required to perform adequate scientific studies must be extremely 
high before the facts at issue are rendered "unknowable." The mere inability to spend 
the amount of money required to obtain evidence in normal evidentiary situations does 
not render the facts "unknowable." For example, to study what effect long term exposure 
to a new chemical substance would have on human reproductive potential, several years 
would be needed to gather the necessary data, along with extensive scientific testing. See 
note 12, supra. See also GELPE & TARLOCK, supra note 4, at 393-94. 
17 A third possibility is that the information is unavailable to the plaintiff but availa-
ble to the defendant. In this situation, traditional theories of reallocation of the burden 
of proof may be available to place the burden on the defendant. Such reallocation theo-
ries require generally that when certain facts in question are more readily accessible to 
one party, that party has the burden of proving those facts. McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 
§ 337. A notion that courts sometimes find to be significant in determining the proper 
allocation of the burden of proof, however, is the judicial estimate of probabilities of the 
situation. The risk of failure of proof may thereby be placed upon the party which al-
leges the more unusual event. Id. at 787. Thus, a plaintiff alleging the more unlikely 
factual situation may still carry the burden of proof. Id. § 339. 
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tur, the event must be a kind which ordinarily does not occur in 
the absence of negligence, must be caused by an instrumentality 
within the exclusive control of the defendant, and must not re-
sult from any voluntary action by the plaintiff.18 
An illustrative case in the toxic contamination context is 
Reynolds Metal Co. u. Yturbide, 19 where the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur was applied to the escape of noxious gases from an alu-
minum reduction plant. The Reynolds court acknowledged an 
absence of proof as to what amounts of the noxious gases actu-
ally passed over the plaintiff's land.20 The court nonetheless con-
cluded that the quantities of fluorides known to be present on 
plaintiff's property would not have been emitted into the air, 
and would not have settled on plaintiff's property in the absence 
of defendant's negligence. By imposing res ipsa loquitur the 
court assessed liability without requiring the plaintiff to meet 
the usual standard of proof of cause-in-fact, and allowed damage 
relief. 
However, application of res ipsa loquitur in a groundwater 
pollution situation such as Hemlock, Michigan, would be more 
difficult. First, the groundwater situation requires drawing a 
more tenuous causal link that the defendant was the source of 
the pollutant, because movements of substances through 
groundwaters are harder to trace than the movement of sub-
stances through the air.21 Second, a difficult proof problem may 
arise in establishing that the charged defendant was the only 
possible source of the groundwater contaminants. This was not a 
problem in Reynolds because the defendant's plant was the only 
possible source of flouride contaminants in the area.22 Ground-
waters, however, may travel large distances, raising the possibil-
ity that the contaminants came from a source further away. 
Third, the accident could have occurred without anyone being 
involved. Some toxic substances occur in groundwaters naturally 
(albeit rarely), a possibility which might make a court .reluctant 
to invoke res ipsa loquitur. 
Consequently, because the only tort doctrine designed to han-
dle uncertain cause-in-fact situations is likely to be unusable, 
scientific uncertainty may make it impossible to meet the tradi-
tional burden of proof. People suffering the often serious conse-
•• See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 39. 
•• 258 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 840 (1958). 
•• Id. at 326. 
11 Tracing groundwater movement involves technical and difficult scientific analyses. 
See note 11 supra. 
11 258 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1958). 
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quences of groundwater pollution must therefore search else-
where for adequate compensation schemes. 
B. Existing Statutory Schemes 
Hazardous substances have been enacted in a piecemeal fash-
ion. Provisions of several statutes, however, are potentially avail-
able to plaintiffs faced with toxic waste groundwater pollution. 
The most noteworthy are the "imminent hazard" provisions con-
tained in several federal statutes, 23 which generally apply when a 
pollution source presents "an imminent and substantial endan-
germent to the health of persons."24 
The most promising statutes for victims of groundwater pol-
lution are the Clean Water Act (CWA),211 Safe Drinking Water 
Act (SDWA),26 and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA).27 A close examination of the relevant language, how-
ever, calls into question the applicability of these provisions to 
the Hemlock-type situation. For example, the Clean Water Act 
gives the Administrator of the EPA the power to set effluent 
standards pertaining to toxic substances.28 However, the courts 
have been reluctant to apply the CW A to groundwater pollu-
tion.29 The Safe Drinking Water Act protects public drinking 
water supplies from contaminants which are dangerous to 
health, and is a promising source of relief. The SDWA applies, 
however, to public water supplies and not to private wells.30 
•• See, e.g., Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (Supp. II 
1976); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(e) (1976); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a) 
(1976); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7603(a) (Supp. II 1976); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 300(i) (1976); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2606 (Supp. 1979); 
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(d) (1976); Consumer 
Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (1976); Hazardous Materials Transportation Act, 
49 U.S.C. § 1810(b) (1976); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 662 (1976); 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136d(c) (1976); Deep-
water Ports Act, 33 U.S.C. § 15ll(b) (1976); Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 u:s.C. 
§ 355(e) (1976). See generally Tripp and Jaffe, supra note 6 . 
.. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a) (1976) . 
•• 33 u.s.c. § 1251-§ 1376 (1976) . 
.. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1976 & Supp. II 1978). 
07 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987 (1976 & Supp. II 1978). 
•• 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1976 & Supp. II 1978). 
19 The dispute over the applicability of the Clean Water Act concerns whether "navi-
gable waters" includes groundwater. Two courts have denied EPA jurisdiction over well 
injection of waste: Exxon Corp. v. Train, 554 F.2d 1310 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. 
GAF Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1379 (S.D. Tex. 1975). See generally Tripp & Jaffe, supra note 
6, at 10-14. 
00 A "public water system" must have at least fifteen service connections or serve at 
least twenty-five people. 42 U.S.C. § 300f(4) (1976). 
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A further problem inherent in the present statutory maze is 
that only injunctive relief is explicitly made available. Most of 
the imminent hazard provisions limit available relief to immedi-
ate injunctions. 81 One possible exception may be provided by 
those imminent hazard provisions which state that the Adminis-
trator of the EPA may bring suit to immediately restrain dispo-
sal or take other such action as may be necessary.82 However, 
the meaning of the phrase, "take other such action as may be 
necessary", is unclear. No answer has developed as to whether 
the Administrator may bring suit to collect damages for the vic-
tims of an "imminent hazard," or whether he is restricted to 
seeking only injunctive relief. 
"Citizen suit" mechanisms found in many statutes containing 
imminent hazard provisions88 present another set of obstacles to 
the toxic waste victim seeking statutory relief. When the govern-
ment fails to take action, private citizens may bring suit under 
these provisions. 84 Although jurisdictional and standing require-
ments have been substantially relaxed for citizen suits,811 a num-
ber of procedural barriers still remain. For example, most immi-
nent hazard provisions contain notice requirements,86 and 
litigation costs may be awarded to any party. 87 The spectre of 
11 See, e.g., Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 2606 (Supp. 1979). 
•• See, e.g., Clean Water Act's imminent hazard provision, 33 U.S.C. § 1364 (Supp. II 
1978); or the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (Supp. II 1978). 
11 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1976); Toxic Substances Control Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 2619 (Supp. 1979); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (1976 & 
Supp. II 1978); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2 (1977) (current version at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7604 Supp. II 1978); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972 (Supp. 
II 1978) . 
.. For example, read along with RCRA's citizen suit provision, Id. § 6972, the "other 
action as may be necessary" language raises the question whether a citizen, in the ab-
sence of any action by the Administrator, may independantly bring suit for damages 
even though such a cause of action is not explicitly granted within the RCRA. 
16 Jurisdictional requirements have been relaxed by allowing "any citizen" to bring 
such a suit, without regard to diversity of citizenship or jurisdictional amounts. See, e.g., 
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1976). Also, the normal "injury in fact" requirements 
for standing have been read to have been eliminated. See, e.g., Metropolitan Washington 
Coalitition for Clean Air v. District of Columbia, 511 F.2d 809, 814 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
See generally w. RODGERS, H~NDBOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 1.13 (1977). 
ae Most citizen suit provisions forbid commencement of an action "prior to sixty days 
after the plaintiff has been given notice of the alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, 
(ii) to the State in which the violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the 
standard, limitation, or order .... " Clean Air Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(l)(A) (1976). The 
courts have interpreted such language not to impose strict procedural requirements, but 
to allow flexible and realistic requirements to be placed on citizens. See, e.g., Friends of 
the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 175 (2d Cir. 1976). But cf. Massachusetts v. U.S. Veter-
ans Administration, 541 F.2d 119, 121 (1st Cir. 1976). See generally W. RODGERS, supra 
note 35, § 1.13. 
17 See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (1976), giving the courts the power 
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liability for the opposing counsel's litigation costs may chill 
plaintiffs from pursuing even meritorious claims. The citizen 
suit option may well be foreclosed because of these procedural 
demands. If the government fails to bring suit, victims of toxic 
substance poisoning could be left without a procedural avenue 
for seeking the relief provided by the remedial sections of the 
statutes. 38 
Another potential source of statutory relief for groundwater 
pollution victims are statutes imposing strict liability for activi-
ties dealing with particular subjects. 39 Some states have enacted 
statutes invoking strict liability for damage caused by oil pol-
lution,'0 and Congress has passed strict liability provisions for 
injuries inflicted by certain pesticides. n Congress has also pro-
vided compensation for nuclear catastrophes on a strict liability 
basis.0 All of these statutory schemes, however, still require the 
plaintiff to prove causation with complete certainty.'3 Seriously 
injured parties may still remain uncompensated if scientific un-
certainty undermines the causation element of their case. 
II. THE RISK-BENEFIT APPROACH TO CAUSATION ANALYSIS 
A. Reserve Mining and the Risk-Benefit Approach 
One response to scientific uncertainty on causation questions 
in environmental lawsuits has been termed the "risk-benefit" 
approach." This approach was applied in the landmark case 
Reserve _Mining Co. v. Environmental Protection Agency'15 in 
to award litigation costs to any party. 
38 This would be particularly true in those instances when the government agency 
given enforcement powers under the applicable statute, is unresponsive for political or 
other reasons, or, due to its limited resources, is simply unable to respond . 
.. See generally Note, The Rylands v. Fletcher Doctrine in America: Abnormally 
Dangerous, Ultra-Hazardous, or Absolute Nuisance?, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 99 (1978). 
•• See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 46.03.822-.824 (1977); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 1376.12 (1975); Me. 
Rev. Stat. Tit. 38, §§ 541, 552 (1964 & Supp. 1980); Md. Nat. Res. Code Ann. § 8-1409 
(1974). 
•• See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1444a(d) (1976). 
41 See, e.g., Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1976). 
•• See, e.g., Wheatland Irrig. Distrib. v. McGuire, 537 P.2d 1128, 1133 (Wyo. 1975); 
Me. Rev. Stat. Tit. 38 §§ 541, 552 (1964 & Supp. 1980); Md. Nat. Res. Code Ann. § 8-
1409 (1974). 
•• See generally Gelpe & Tarlock, The Uses of Scientific Information in Environ-
mental Decisionmaking, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 371 (1974). 
•• 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975). See generally R. BARTLETT, THE RESERVE MINING CoN-
TROVERSY (1980); Note, Reserve Mining-The Standard of Proof Required to Enjoin an 
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the context of injunctive relief. In Reserve Mining, asbestos 
fibers were discharged from defendant's processing plant into 
Lake Superior, which supplies drinking water for local commu-
nities. The plant also discharged asbestos fibers into the air. In-
junctive relief hinged on the applicability of the imminent haz-
ard provision of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
(FWPCA),'6 but scientific evidence was inconclusive on the key 
question as to whether the asbestos fibers would cause increased 
rates of cancer among the people ingesting them. 47 The court di-
rectly addressed the problem of scientific uncertainty, discussing 
in detail the complex testimony presented at trial. ' 8 When proof 
with certainty is impossible, the court stated, "concepts of po-· 
tential harm, whether they be assessed as 'probabilities and con-
sequences' or 'risk and harm,' necessarily must apply .... "49 
The court then assessed the gravity of potential harm and the 
degree of certainty that the harm could occur,60 weighing this 
against the benefits gained by allowing the alle.gedly harmful ac-
tivity to occur.61 After careful consideration of the benefits, eco-
nomic and otherwise, provided by the company's presence in the 
area, 62 the court ordered injunctive relief. 63 
Reserve Mining, of course, cannot be read as a carte blanche 
endorsement of risk-benefit analysis for all damage litigation in 
toxic contamination situations. The risk-benefit analysis in Re.,-
serve Mining involved a statutory imminent hazard provision, 
not a common law action for damages.64 Secondly, attention in 
Environmental Hazard to Health, 59 MINN. L. REv. 893 (1975). 
•• 33 U.S.C. § 1160 (1970), amended Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 2, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (now 
33 U.S.C. § 1354). The case was tried under the statute as it existed before the 1972 
amendments. 
47 514 F.2d 492, 538 (8th Cir. 1975). See also R. BARTLE'IT, supra note 45, at 154-57. 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the two types of discharges posed 
different degrees of potential harm. Reserve was allowed to continue for a reasonable 
time its disposal of taconite tailings in Lake Superior-until an on-land disposal system 
could be implemented. However, the Court ordered Reserve to take_ reasonable immedi-
ate steps to reduce the air emissions. Id. at 500. 
•• Id. at 506-20. 
•• Id. at 520. 
00 Id. at 535-37. 
•• Id. 
•• The court noted that Reserve employed over 3,000 people in the area and had a 
payroll of approximately $31,000,000 per year. 
•• Id. at 537-40. 
04 The applicability of risk-benefit analysis to a common law public nuisance action 
was left unanswered, because no evidence of an interstate hazard was found. Id. at 520-
21. The court did find that Reserve's air emissions were in violation of various provisions 
of Minnesota's pollution control Jaws, and could therefore be enjoined as a public nui-
sance. Id. at 522-27. The court stated, however: "In light of this statute, (providing that 
violations of statutory air pollution standards constitute a public nuisance] we deem it 
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Reserve Mining focused on injunctive rather than compensatory 
relief, involving consideration of factors traditionally associated 
with precautionary relief. 1111 The underlying rationale of Reserve 
Mining, however, does have application beyond the procedural 
context addressed explicitly in the decision. At the very least, 
the success of the court in handling detailed information in an 
area of scientific controversy rebuts the argument that such 
analyses cannot be required of or performed adequately by 
courts. More fundamentally, the Reserve Mining decision also 
points out a possible direction for courts to pursue in other areas 
involving scientific uncertainty, especially the damage-award 
context. 
B. Applying the Risk-Benefit Approach to Compensatory 
Rather than Injunctive Relief 
As discussed in Part I above, common law doctrines are essen-
tially unavailable to plaintiffs who are unable to show a cause-
in-fact relationship between injury and the defendant's activity. 
The present statutory framework seems similarly unlikely to 
provide relief. This results in the anomalous situation that 
courts may order relief when a toxic waste hazard is "immi-
nent," but refuse to do so when the hazard becomes actual. Citi-
zens are thus protected from potential injury, while victims are 
left unprotected from actual effects. 
This anomalous situation raises two competing equities. On 
one hand, the victim of the toxic substance contamination will 
be stranded without relief if the burden of proof of causation is 
not lowered, simply because necessary information is unobtain-
able. On the other hand, causation requirements ensure that the 
correct party is held responsible for a plaintiff's injuries. Relax-
ing this element of plaintiff's prima facie case raises the spectre 
unnecessary to discuss whether Reserve's air emissions could constitute a public nui-
sance independently of violations of the state's air pollution control regulations." Id. at 
524. 
•• In the nuisance area, for example, courts will often weigh hardship to the defendant 
in deciding whether to grant an injunction. Thus courts may deny injunctive relief when 
the balance of equities is resolved in favor of the defendant even though a nuisance has 
been proven to exist. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 309 
N.Y.S.2d 312, 257 N.E.2d 870 (1970). In terms of compensatory relief, however, the com-
parative hardship on the parties is usually immaterial in assessing damages. W. PROSSER, 
supra note 4, § 90. See also W. RODGERS, supra note 35, § 2.5. The relevance of balanc-
ing of equities in determining the existence of a nuisance, however, appears to be unset-
tled. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§§ 822, 826 (1979) (the weighing of hardship is 
incorporated into the determination of a nuisance). 
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of holding a factually innocent defendant liable for damages.'16 
One way to address these competing questions would be to ex-
tend the use of risk-benefit analysis implemented in Reserve 
Mining to cases involving damage awards. Rather than requiring 
the plaintiff to meet the usual burden of proof or shifting it to 
the defendant once the plaintiff has proven a prima facie case, 117 
a sliding scale approach could be implemented to determine the 
degree of certainty of cause-in-fact which the plaintiff must 
prove, on a case-by-case basis. The burden of proof, conse-
quently, would not be a set standard or formulation such as 
"preponderance of the evidence," applicable to every case. In-
stead, the burden of proof on the causation issue would "float," 
varying according to the nature of the case. 
In implementing a risk-benefit approach to causation analysis, 
a court would first make a threshold determination concerning 
the applicability of risk-benefit analysis to the case before it. In 
making this threshold determination, the court would examine 
the nature of the scientific controversy, evaluating the degree of 
uncertainty presented. Where the uncertainty is unresolvable 
and touches on essential areas of plaintiff's case, a strong case 
for lowering the burden on the causatipn issue would be made 
out, and risk-benefit analysis would be deemed appropriate.118 
The court would then proceed with a three-step analysis to as-
sess the proper burden of proof. First, the seriousness of the 
plaintiffs' injury would be weighed. Second, the court would ex-
amine the benefits to th~ community of the defendant's activi-
08 These concerns could, in some situations, pose problems with due process implica-
tions. Burdens of proof, however, are fixed at the pleading stage in civil trials "not for 
constitutional reasons, but for reasons of probability, social policy and convenience." 
McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 344. Although constitutional limits exist on the creation of 
presumptions in civil cases, the adjustment to burden of proof proposed here falls well 
within these bounds. See, e.g., Western & Atlantic R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639, 643 
(1929) (statute creating an inference of negligence in railroad accident cases declared 
invalid, because the mere fact than an accident occurred furnished no basis for an infer-
ence of negligence). 
• 1 See note 15 and accompanying text supra. The shifting of the burden of proof to 
the defendant once the plaintiff has proven a prims facie case has been suggested as a 
more equitable approach to the proof problem in nuisance actions involving environmen-
tal degradation. It is argued that doing so would give nuisance actions modern vitality by 
incorporating new public policies mandating environmental protection. See Note, The 
Burden of Proof in California Environmental Nuisance Cases, 9 U. CALIF. D. L. REV. 
679 (1976). Also, a number of state environmental protection acts have implemented 
such an approach. E.g., the Michigan Environmental Protection Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANNOT. § 6901.1203 (1970). 
•• Some scientific controversies are narrowly focused, esoteric, and do not go to the 
heart of plaintiffs' causation analyses. Others, like the dispute in Reserve Mining 
(whether ingesting asbestos fibers causes gastrointestinal cancer), involve substantial 
scientific disagreement on questions essential to plaintiffs' cases. 
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ties, and the effects on those activities of imposing a damage 
award on the company. In the third and final step, the court 
would balance the result of the "injury" and "benefit" inquiries 
against the degree of uncertainty presented by the scientific in-
formation introduced into evidence. As the seriousness of the 
harms to plaintiffs increases, and the benefits of defendant's ac-
tivity become less, the less certain need be proof of causation. 
On the basis of this balancing, the court would decide whether 
the evidence presented adequately shows a causal connection be-
tween defendant's actions and plaintiff's harms to enable plain-
tiff to meet the burden of proving causation. 
The first step, examining the seriousness of the injuries to 
health, addresses a central concern of tort law: not to leave inno-
cent victims of another's conduct uncompensated.119 This con-
cern magnifies with the seriousness of the injury, and should be 
considered by examining both the type of injuries and their ex-
tent. For example, a small number of plaintiffs with potentially 
terminal cancer would be considered as serious as a large num-
ber of victims suffering from reproductive system disorders.60 
The second step, examining the benefits of defendant's activ-
ity, addresses the second competing equity, by requiring that as 
more societal benefits are sacrificed by imposing liability, the 
causal link should become more certain. Economic benefits 
-such as jobs and other contributions to the local econ-
omy-must therefore be considered. These economic benefits, 
however, should be considered only to the extent that they will 
be lost by imposition of liability.61 In the injunction context, the 
spectre of closing a plant down requires considering the total 
benefits provided by the plant, because all benefits are indeed 
lost by a shutdown. A damage award, however, need not result 
in total loss of economic benefits; the costs of liability to a large 
company may in fact have no effect whatsoever on employment, 
and only a negligible effect on other benefits. Only that portion 
of economic benefit actually affected by the potential damage 
award would be considered. 
The third "balancing" step injects, to a certain extent, policy 
determinations into the causation analysis. Such policy consider-
ations are, however, manifest in courts' proximate cause deter-
•• W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 1 at 6. 
80 The Love Canal situation is an example where both the type of harms and their 
extent are serious. See note 2 and accompanying text supra. 
• 1 This would primarily involve an assessment of the economic effects of damage relief, 
i.e., whether the defendant's plant would be shut down, how many jobs would be lost, 
how much income to the community would be lost, etc. 
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minations generally. As Judge Edgerton has aptly noted in his 
classic work on causation,62 the proximate cause decision in-
volves "a balancing of conflicting interests, individual and so-
cial," aimed at determining whether legal cause is "justly attach-
able" cause.63 In a sense, then, the causation analysis proposed 
here is simply an extension of proximate cause principles to the 
cause-in-fact determination under appropriate circumstances.64 
Obviously, the appropriate balancing of these factors cannot 
be performed in the abstract. It may be helpful, then, to look at 
how risk-benefit causation analysis might be applied to the 
Hemlock, Michigan, situation. First, the court would examine 
the nature of the scientific uncertainty presented. Given the 
scientific and technical difficulties involved in mapping ground 
water ,611 and the controversy surrounding the link between the 
well-water contaminants and plaintiffs' injuries,66 risk-benefit 
causation analysis would be clearly appropriate. The court 
would then examine the seriousness of plaintiffs' health injuries, 
i.e., miscarriages, tumors, serious nervous system disorders.67 
These are clearly serious harms, and would support reduction of 
the burden on the causation issue. The court would next ex-
amine the economic benefits provided by Dow Chemical's pres-
ence in the area, and the impact that a damage claim would 
have on provision of those benefits. Because such a damage 
award, unless very high, would not seriously harm Dow's eco-
nomic position, this factor would only slightly raise the burden 
of proving causation. Finally, the court would examine the 
evidence offered in proof of causation, and determine whether it 
showed a sufficient causal link in light of the above 
considerations. 
Extending the Reserve Mining approach to situations involv-
ing compensatory rather than injunctive relief is warranted for a 
variety of reasons. For one, the competing interests in both con-
texts are similar. In both the Reserve Mining and Hemlock, 
Michigan, situations, for example, the health interests of resi-
dents are in conflict with the economic interests of the defen-
dant and the community at large. In addition, the effects of 
granting relief are not so dissimilar as to justify different treat-
•• Edgerton, Legal Cause (pts. 1-2), 72 U. PA. L. REV. 211, 343 (1924). 
•• Id. at 211. 
.. For discussion of the role policy pla~ in proximate cause analysis, see W. PROSSER, 
-supra note 4, § 42. 
•• See note 11 and accompanying text supra. 
08 See note 12 and accompanying text supra. 
07 See notes 4-10 and accompanying text supra. 
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ment. Indeed, an injunction, in practice, may be a more burden-
some remedy than a damage award,68 which would seem to call 
for a higher burden of proof for injunctions. More importantly, 
the rationale for a flexible standard of proof stems more from 
the scientific uncertainties involved-a characteristic shared by 
both the Reserve Mining and Hemlock situations-than from 
the nature of the remedy at issue. Continued disparity of causa-
tion treatment between toxic waste cases calling for injunctions, 
and toxic waste cases calling for damage awards, thus seems un-
justified on many levels. Finally, the kind of burden-of-proof ad-
aptation urged here is not unprecedented. Courts have histori-
cally altered burdens of proof to reflect changing conditions or 
values,69 and the risk-benefit approach has been implemented in 
areas other than tort causation.70 
A number of possible objections to risk-benefit analysis need 
to be addressed. The first is the concern, possibly reaching due 
process dimensions,71 that innocent defendants may be held lia-
ble under this approach. It should be observed that the Reserve 
Mining situation involved a lone, isolated industrial facility.72 If 
anyone is liable for toxic waste pollution in this kind of situa-
tion, it is most likely to be the defendants. Certainly, at some 
level of low probability, the chances that even a lone defendant 
was the factual cause of plaintiffs' injury is so low that it would 
be arbitrary, unfair, and perhaps unconstitutional to hold that 
98 See, e.g., Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312, 257 
N.E.2d 870 (1970) (Injunctive relief denied while damage relief imposed due to less seri-
ous effects of latter on economic benefits provided by defendant's activities). 
•• For example, our procedural laws, in their early development, tended to favor in-
dustrial and economic growth at the expense of other values. "The common law embod-
ied a general preference for the initiator of economically productive action, by casting 
the burden of persuasion on an aggrieved person to show cause why law should intervene 
to shift a loss from where it fell as a consequence of the initiative taken." J. HURST, LAW 
AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 224 (1964). See generally Krier, Environmental Litigation and 
the Burden of Proof, in LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT, 105 (M. Murdoch & J. Page, Jr. ed. 
1970). A specific example is provided by workmen's compensation law. Early in the de-
velopment of the law of injured employees the employee-plaintiff had to prove he was 
not injured by a co-worker. See, e.g., Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Leach, 208 Ill. 198, 200-201, 
70 N.E. 222, 223 (1904). The new attitude in burden of proof rules may allow the injured 
employee to reach a jury on a scintilla of evidence. See, e.g., Note, FELA, Negligence, 
and Jury Trials-Speculation Upon a Scintilla, 11 W. RES. L. REV. 123 (1959). 
70 A number of court decisions have upheld the use of risk-benefit principles by 
agencies involved in promulgating regulations where the types of harm the agency is 
authorized to prevent are difficult to prove by ordinary judicial standards. See, e.g., 
South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 655 n. 6 (1st Cir. 1974); Industrial Union 
Dep't AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1974); See also Gelpe & 
Tarlock, supra note 4, at 417-19. 
71 See note 56 supra. 
1
• See R. BARTLETT, supra note 45, at 3. 
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defendant liable. 73 This potential problem should be addressed 
during the courts' threshold determination of applicability of 
the analysis in light of the probabilities presented by the scien-
tific uncertainties. Courts, of course, will also have to adjust the 
appropriate level of proof arrived at in the balancing of the third 
step to ensure that imposition of liability is not arbitrary. A 
more difficult problem arises when there is more than one poten-
tial source of the pollutant. In such a case, i.e., if the plaintiffs 
lived in a large industrial city where any number of potential 
defendants could have emitted the toxic substances that caused 
the harm, then courts will have to adjust their notions of appro-
priate level of proof to reflect a concern that the proper defen-
dant is. held liable. Of course, if all possible firms are joined as 
defendants, the plaintiffs may be able to show to a sufficient de-
gree that all defendants, considered together, caused the harm. 
At this point traditional joint and several liability analysis, or 
emerging theories of "enterprise liability," would apportion 
liability among the defendants. 7 ' 
Ill. RISK-BENEFIT CAUSATION OR "SUPERFUND"? 
Recent legislative efforts present an alternative to the judicial 
solution suggested above. Congress has recently considered re-
forms on two fronts. Recent legislation, often referred to as the 
"superfund," will create a government-controlled fund to pro-
vide monies for emergency clean-up of toxic substance pollution 
posing serious risks.76 All producers and handlers of hazardous 
substances will be required to contribute to the fund. A second 
~pproach which failed to pass would have required that owners 
or operators of facilities disposing of hazardous substances be 
held strictly liable for damages caused by their activities, includ-
ing costs of emergency clean-up, and damages for economic loss 
and personal injury.78 
71 See note 56 supra. See also Newman, The Process of Prescribing "Due Process," 49 
CALIF. L. REV. 215, 221 (1961). 
" See, e.g., Oakwood Homeowners Assoc. v. Ford Motor Co., 77 Mich. App. 197, 258 
N.W.2d 475 (1977). See generally, W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 52. 
70 See Comprehensive Environmental Responses, Compensation, and Liability Act of 
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980). 
•• Most importantly, one of the proposed bills, S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), 
would have imposed a more relaxed causation requirement on the party seeking such 
relief. Under this bill's original language the injured party would satisfy the requisite 
--' burden of proof if he showed that there is a "reasonable likelihood that [the exposure) 
was sufficient to cause or significantly contribute to injury or disease .... " Id. § 
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Congress has therefore addressed only half of the problem. 
While providing funds for the clean-up of pollution, the legisla-
tion fails to provide compensation for injuries. Although adding 
an administrative compensation scheme77 to the present super-
fund would certainly improve the current state of the law, relief 
through the judicial system would provide better compensation 
for individual victims, lead to a more economically efficient out-
come, and more · effectively stimulate implementation of safer 
waste disposal methods. 
To the extent economic costs are more precisely assigned to 
those members of the industry that actually caused those costs 
economic efficiencies are increased. 78 Because tort liability is the 
most direct and accurate means of assigning damage costs to the 
responsible firm or firms, this method will lead to a more eco-
nomically efficient outcome79 than the loss-spreading mechanism 
of the superfund. Under one type of superfund compensation 
approach, where contribution is based on production volume,80 
an individual firm's contribution is not related to the societal 
costs attributable to the firm's particular disposal method.81 Ac-
cordingly, if a firm maintains a disposal method more dangerous 
than the industry norm, it will be charged less than the actual 
cost its activities impose on society; a firm that utilizes a method 
of disposal safer than the industry norm may end up being 
4(c)(3)(A). In addition, the bill allowed statistical probabilities to be considered by the 
court in addressing the causation issue. Id. § 4(a). This proposed legislation therefore 
addressed many of those problems discussed above which are inherent in the present 
judicial "fault system" approach to groundwater pollution damage relief. 
77 See, e.g., Soble, A Proposal for the Administrative Compensation of Victims of 
Toxic Substance Pollution: A Model Act, 14 HARV. J. LEGIS. 683 (1977). 
78 For a general overview of the economic perspective of tort liability see R. RABIN, 
PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW 139-210 (1976). 
79 Tort liability allows victims of toxic waste pollution to collect the costs of the dam-
ages they have suffered directly from the individual firm that has caused those costs. To 
the extent that a tort liability mechanism holds liable firms responsible for injuries 
caused by their toxic waste, the cost borne by disposers will approach total societal cost. 
Therefore, societal cost is absorbed largely by the responsible parties, a more efficient 
outcome. 
80 The important characteristic of one type of proposed superfund scheme (see, e.g., S. 
1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)) is that the cost placed on each individual firm will be 
based solely on the amount of product that firm creates. 
81 Thus, no direct correlation exists between the potential damages an individual 
firm's disposal methods may incur, and the actual cost that firm pays. In actual practice, 
the agency impleinenting a superfund which would pay for all the costs of damages im-
posed by the industry as a whole, would need to determine the amount of those costs. 
The amount of the fee placed on each firm per unit produced would be the total costs to 
society of toxic-waste-caused-damages divided by the number of units produced by the 
entire industry. The amount each firm pays would equal the number of units it produces 
times the charge per unit. 
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charged higher costs. The end result will often be an over- or 
under-assessment of costs to the individual disposer. 
A second type of superfund compensation scheme would base 
contributions more directly upon the dangers posed by the in-
dividual firm's method of disposal,82 and better nandle this 
problem. The administrator of such a superfund, however, would 
have to determine the degree of danger and· the resulting costs 
in advance and in the abstract. The accuracy of such a fund in 
assigning costs would hinge on how good the administrator's 
guesses proved to be. 
Another important element of any method of pollution control 
is its ability to stimulate the search for and the use of safer dis-
posal methods. Imposing tort liability provides a kind of deter-
rence which stimulates positive and constructive consideration 
of alternatives.83 Because firms in the marketplace will minimize 
the costs of production, including, e.g., damage liability, when-
ever possible, they will have an incentive to develop and use 
safer production methods. In contrast, paying a superfund 
charge results in elimination of individual firm liability. There-
fore, virtually no incentive is provided to reduce costs of liability 
by use of safer methods. Indeed, the result may be to create the 
incentive to dispose of wastes in the cheapest manner possible, 
without regard to the dangers posed, or the subsequent costs to 
society. This effect is minimized by superfund contribution 
mechanisms geared to the perceived danger of the disposal 
method, but again, such a mechanism depends heavily on 
guesswork. 
Finally, the transaction costs of an elaborate superfund com-
pensation scheme far exceed those of the judicial solution 
presented here. The superfund scheme would require the crea-
tion of a bureaucracy to assess and collect charges, and to ad-
minister the distribution of compensation.8 ' The judicial ap-
proach obviously avoids this by using the existing judicial 
system. To be sure, the risk-benefit approach would create addi-
tional costs within the judicial system, but the costs would be 
less than those from creation of an entirely new agency. 
•• See, e.g., S. 1046, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). · 
•• Katz, The Function of Tort Liability in Technology Assessment, 38 U. CIN. L. REV. 
587, 607 (1969). 
•• The Environmental Protection Agency has estimated that from 1,000 to 1,500 
·employees will be needed to administer the superfund program. See, e.g., (1980) 11 
ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 705. 
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Toxic waste pollution poses widespread problems with serious 
implications for human health. Scientific uncertainty, however, 
often enshrouds the facts needed to satisfy current judicial stan-
dards for proof of cause-in-fact, leaving the victims of toxic sub-
stance injury withdut relief in some instances. Since judicial 
standards of causation are clearly inadequate to deal with cases 
at the frontiers of scientific knowledge, change is needed. 
A relaxed burden of proof, within carefully determined limita-
tions, represents such a change. The risk-benefit approach would 
alleviate hardship in situations where relief is denied simply be-
cause essential information is unobtainable. Moreover, it pro-
vides a solution more economically efficient than the superfund. 
As control of environmental degradation becomes more costly, 
the adoption of the solution that allows the most efficient alloca-
tion of economic costs and resources becomes even more crucial. 
This article has focused upon toxic chemical waste disposal 
and the possibility of associated groundwater pollution as a 
prime example which begs for judicial attention. Courts may dis-
cover other areas which demand similar consideration. The path 
is clear. Courts have the ability to institute these vital reforms, 
and it is to be hoped they will soon take the first steps towards a 
better view of causation. 
-Bradford W. Kuster 
